Millianism

As stated, this view is consistent with Millianism (it would be Millianism if we assumed that the semantic value of a definite description was the individual it referred to), however in practice it is always coupled with a view on which definite descriptions have either a Russellian (see the section on Russell's theory in the entry on descriptions) or an intensional semantics (see the section on Sense Theories above).

Names Cumming, Sam 2009

Even if we don't find Russell's epistemological views persuasive, names without a referent (e.g. ˜Atlantis™) pose a problem for Millianism.

Names Cumming, Sam 2009

Millianism and the intensional interpretation of Frege's view both entail this thesis (“functionalism”) about names.

Names Cumming, Sam 2009

The most common response to this problem is a retreat from Millianism for empty terms.

Natural Kinds Bird, Alexander 2008

Millianism implies that there is no semantic difference between these terms at all.

Natural Kinds Bird, Alexander 2008

The question carries some importance in view of the popularity of Millianism, but it has not been discussed much in the literature, despite all of the debate about the correctness of Millianism.

Rigid Designators LaPorte, Joseph 2006

Whether this Gricean defense of Millianism succeeds is a matter of debate.

Implicature Davis, Wayne 2005

According to Kripke, Mill was right about proper names but wrong about kinds; Millianism ” Mill's denotation-without-connotation view ” is right for both sorts of term.

Natural Kinds Bird, Alexander 2008

The retreat from pure Millianism (and a partial vindication of Mill's own view of general terms, which Kripke rejected, need not undermine the claim that kind terms are rigid designators.

Natural Kinds Bird, Alexander 2008