transworld

The discussion so far may suggest that whether the notion of transworld identity (that an object exists in more than one world) is problematic depends solely on whether one adopts an account of possible worlds as concrete entities such as Lewis's (in which case it is) or an account of possible worlds as abstract entities such as Plantinga's (in which case it is not).

Transworld Identity Mackie, Penelope 2006

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A good discussion of the whole problem of transworld identity can be found in Mackie 2008.

Roderick Chisholm Feldman, Richard 2008

However, one central issue was whether the claim that an individual exists in more than one possible world (and hence that there are cases of transworld identity) needs to be backed by the provision of criteria of transworld identity, and, if so, why.

Transworld Identity Mackie, Penelope 2006

If the transworld identity theorist were a Lewisian realist about possible worlds, this notion of existence in a world could be clearly distinguished from the neutral notion of existence according to a world, on the grounds that the existence of Russell in a world would require his complete or partial presence as a part of such a world (cf. Section 1.2 above).

Transworld Identity Mackie, Penelope 2006

Thus much discussion in this area has concerned the comparative merits of the transworld identity and counterpart-theoretic accounts as interpretations, within a possible-worlds framework, of statements of what is possible and necessary for particular individuals.

Transworld Identity Mackie, Penelope 2006

The view that an individual's transworld identity is

Transworld Identity Mackie, Penelope 2006

However, even if all three of these assumptions can be dismissed as bad, or at least inadequate, reasons for supposing that transworld identity requires criteria of transworld identity (and hence for supposing that there is a problem of transworld identity), it does not follow that there are no good reasons for this supposition.

Transworld Identity Mackie, Penelope 2006