supervaluationism

Two of the leading theories of vagueness, epistemicism and supervaluationism, provide principled reasons to reject M2.

The Problem of the Many Weatherson, Brian 2009

˜Moorean™ move that says that the premise that there is one cloud in the sky is more plausible than the premises that would have to be used in an argument against supervaluationism.

The Problem of the Many Weatherson, Brian 2009

Alternatively, it might be claimed that the main argument for supervaluationism is an inference to the best explanation.

The Problem of the Many Weatherson, Brian 2009

I will then discuss some rival theories of vagueness with an emphasis on many-valued logic, supervaluationism and contextualism.

Vagueness Sorensen, Roy 2006

Even if one agrees that supervaluationism converges with classical logic about theoremhood, they clearly differ in other respects.

Vagueness Sorensen, Roy 2006

After the clarification, some wonder how supervaluationism differs from drastic metaphysical skepticism.

Vagueness Sorensen, Roy 2006

Supervaluationists have responded by noting that though the T-schema is not true a corresponding mutual entailment thesis is not threatened: ˜p™ is true entails and is entailed by p. Strictly weaker than the corresponding claim involving the conditional according to supervaluationism, it might be wondered whether the weaker commitment is sufficient to capture what matters about truth.

Sorites Paradox Hyde, Dominic 2005

Though counterintuitive, the semantic anomalies that beset supervaluationism should be accepted because they are part of a theory which fares better overall than any other.

Sorites Paradox Hyde, Dominic 2005

Burgess and Humberstone (1987), while agreeing to the type (2) response advocated by supervaluationists, take issue with the much-discussed retention of the law of excluded middle in supervaluationism, adopting instead a variation on supervaluationist logic which abandons this law in the face of seeming counter-examples presented by vagueness.

Sorites Paradox Hyde, Dominic 2005

As already noted when discussing supervaluationism, theories that abandon bivalence have been charged with having to reject the required Tarskian constraint on truth encapsulated in his T-schema:

Sorites Paradox Hyde, Dominic 2005